Beyer, Subramanyam Request Supplemental GAO Review into Army’s Systemic Conditions and Practices Leading to Tragic DCA Collision

U.S. Representatives Don Beyer (D-VA) and Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA) yesterday led 45 House Democrats in requesting that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a comprehensive review of the systemic conditions and operational practices that preceded the January 29, 2025 midair collision between American Eagle Flight 5342 and a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter near National Airport (DCA), which claimed the lives of 67 passengers and crew. The lawmakers urged GAO to examine broader systemic issues related to Army aviation safety and training practices beyond the scope of the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation, including staffing, training, safety culture, mission risk management, civil-military coordination, aviation technology, and oversight practices. Citing reports of near misses between military and commercial aircraft in DCA airspace, the lawmakers also emphasized that the review should pay particular attention to units operating regularly in complex civilian airspace, including those based in the National Capital Region. In a letter to Acting Comptroller General Orice W. Brown, the lawmakers wrote : We write with concern about the effectiveness of the Army’s aviation safety culture and in particular, its practices in civilian airspace in the aftermath of the January 29, 2025 collision of an Army Sikorsky H-60 helicopter with American Eagle Flight 5342, which claimed the lives of 67 passengers and crew. Other reports of near misses between military and commercial aircraft call into question broader patterns across military aviation in ensuring safety. Given the collision and instances of near-misses, as well as the gaps identified in Army safety culture and processes in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)’s investigation of this collision, we respectfully request that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a review or series of reviews evaluating the Army’s aviation safety and training practices, including its policies and procedures for interfacing with civilian aircraft. While we understand GAO will not re-investigate the January 29 collision, the circumstances surrounding it should clearly inform and frame this review as a reference point for assessing systemic coordination and safety practices. We request that particular attention be given to units that regularly operate in complex civilian airspace, such as those based in the National Capital Region, to assess how Army aviation training, risk management, and coordination practices are applied in practice. We request that GAO assess and examine the following in its review: Staffing & Qualifications Assess Army pilot assignment criteria for Class B/C/D operations (such as local and overall experience, recency, proficiency, flying hours, supervisory ratios, and fatigue management procedures). Assess Army training standards and assignment procedures for pilots and other airspace management personnel for complex operating environments. Assess trends in Army aviator experience, flight hours, and standards for the previous ten years and factors, such as retention and attrition trends, that could adversely affect safety. Training & Standards Assess processes to align Army aviation doctrines, manuals, local standard operating procedures (SOPs), and training programs with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations and local air traffic control (ATC) procedures, including reasons for any differences. Assess Army training programs for night vision goggle operations, visual separation, altimetry use, and spatial-disorientation, and traffic-awareness tools (e.g., ForeFlight, TIS-B, ADS-B and other similar systems), including how units measure training effectiveness and standardization, and whether evaluations are consistently conducted independently and graded with appropriate rigor. Assess Army training and standards for verbal communication with local ATC, including the consistency of compliance with such standards and any retraining or evaluations of compliance with standards throughout pilots’ careers. Safety Culture & Decision Authority Assess the operational safety culture for Army aviation units and factors, such as operational priorities in congested airspace and flight safety, that crews and leadership consider when responding to safety concerns, including whether aviators have appropriate avenues and encouragement to raise concerns or decline missions. Assess the roles and responsibilities of Army governance structures and accountability mechanisms, including coordination with FAA and Department of Defense (DoD) oversight offices, in identifying and addressing safety issues, including the root causes of underlying safety risks and associated mitigations. Risk Management & Technology Assess the adequacy and rigor of mission risk assessments in accounting for real-world traffic flows and hazards, including pre-flight tools and briefings to identify congested or conflicted airspace and to mitigate military-commercial overlaps in planning. Assess the safety implications of ADS-B Out exemptions and other sensor limitations, including FAA/Army processes for granting, tracking, and mitigating such waivers; decision-making authority at the unit, Army, and DoD levels; and Army oversight of its policies for exemptions. Examine the certification process for military-designed aircraft used in civilian airspace and any modernization or equipage upgrades intended to improve safety. Assess whether ground-based surveillance and communication systems used by FAA and DoD, including radar, multilateration, and coordination equipment, provide sufficient coverage and reliability to support joint airspace operations, and whether deficiencies or funding gaps have been prioritized for correction. Civilian Airspace Risk Integration Assess the Army’s risk management procedures to identify and mitigate collision risks to non-participating civilian aircraft. Assess processes and procedures to account for recurring military activity in classes of airspace in the National Airspace System (NAS). Assess whether the risks and mitigation gaps observed in the National Capital Region also exist in other complex civilian airspace hotspots nationwide. Assess whether FAA–DoD coordination mechanisms and communication systems, including airspace handoffs, equipment interoperability, staffing levels in high-density environments, and post-incident coordination and response, adequately ensure situational awareness and safety, and whether known deficiencies have been addressed. Assess whether Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and Letters of Agreement (LOAs) governing Army–FAA operations are consistently reviewed and updated to reflect changing airspace conditions, and whether procedural safeguards exist to ensure continuity of coordination independent of individual relationships or command changes. Civil–Military Coordination Assess Army processes to coordinate with FAA, airport operators, local airspace users, and joint safety forums. Assess Army information-sharing agreements with these entities for collision alerts and hazard mitigations. Assess Army procedures to respond to concerns or recommendations raised through these mechanisms, including whether FAA-identified concerns and irregularities are reliably escalated to Army leadership, addressed in a timely and appropriate manner, and whether agreements such as LOAs are consistently implemented and enforced. Accountability, Data Integrity & Post-Incident Response Assess the completeness and reliability of Army aviation accident and hazard reporting and data retention practices, including alignment with reports from FAA/ATC and other airspace users. Assess whether Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) / Flight Data Monitoring (FDM)-style programs (including flight-data capture, transmission, targeted monitoring of high-risk platforms, analysis, and integration with FAA systems) are used to identify systemic issues and to support coaching that corrects recurring deficiencies. Assess how ongoing records and post-incident responses are preserved and whether decision makers, including the FAA and Congress, receive timely, accurate, and complete information necessary for effective oversight of safety in shared airspace. Thank you for your attention to this matter. The letter is signed by Representatives Don Beyer (D-VA) and Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA), House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA), and Representatives Gabe Amo (D-RI), Jake Auchincloss (D-MA), Joyce Beatty (D-OH), Wesley Bell (D-MO), André Carson (D-IN), Steve Cohen (D-TN), Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), Sarah Elfreth (D-MD), Laura Friedman (D-CA), Maxwell Frost (D-FL), Jesús García (D-IL), Chrissy Houlahan (D-PA), Steny Hoyer (D-MD), Glenn Ivey (D-MD), Jonathan Jackson (D-IL), Sara Jacobs (D-CA), Bill Keating (D-MA), Ro Khanna (D-CA), Greg Landsman (D-OH), Ted Lieu (D-CA), Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Seth Magaziner (D-RI), Sarah McBride (D-DE), April McClain Delaney (D-MD), Jennifer McClellan (D-VA), Kweisi Mfume (D-MD), Kevin Mullin (D-CA), Johnny Olszewski (D-MD), Chris Pappas (D-NH), Mark Pocan (D-WI), Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), Mike Quigley (D-IL), Jamie Raskin (D-MD), Bobby Scott (D-VA), Greg Stanton (D-AZ), Mike Thompson (D-VA), Dina Titus (D-NV), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), Jill Tokuda (D-HI), James Walkinshaw (D-VA), Frederica Wilson (D-FL), and Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC). A signed copy of the letter is available here .